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Abstract: Lucas (1972) was a paper that permanently changed the course of
macroeconomics, even though its “money supply surprise” model lost its central place in
the area within a decade because of empirical difficulties. However, Lucas’s novel
methodology, based on clearing markets and rational expectations, still dominates
orthodox macroeconomic theorising. An unfortunate side effect of this has been that,
because mainstream models have no analytic room for money to play a key role in
economic activity, the theoretical case for taking that role seriously was undermined just
at the time when traditional monetarist macro-models were facing empirical problems.
The consequences of all this for today’s monetary policy environment are briefly
discussed.
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*Notes prepared before, and revised after, the author’s participation in a round table on “Monetary nonneutrality and stabilization policies 50 years after Lucas’ ‘expectations’ paper” held on October 8th,
2021, at the Sofia Conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought. I am
indebted to the other participants in this event, Olivier Blanchard, Beatrice Cherrier, Athanasios
Orphanides, and its Chairperson, Pierrick Clerc, as well as to Mauro Boianovsky, Hans-Michael
Trautwein, and Bill Robson for extremely helpful discussions.
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Introduction
“Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” was hardly a new topic in 1972.
Economists had been debating these matters for about two and a half centuries
even before Maynard Keynes (1936) declared that “a monetary economy … is
essentially one in which changing views about the future are capable of influencing
the quantity of employment and not merely its direction” (Keynes 1936, p. xii).
But Robert Lucas’s view of this time-honoured subject was nevertheless original
and important. When an economist meets a set of economic ideas, it is usually the
economist whose subsequent biography is influenced. This was one of those rare
encounters that permanently changed the evolution of the ideas as well. The
capacity of Lucas’s analysis to do this was quickly recognised, if not in all
quarters. For example, though “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” was
rejected by the American Economic Review, Neil Wallace and Thomas Sargent had
read it in working paper form well before its eventual publication, and, as its
significance sank in, had begun a radical readjustment of their own research by
1973.1
Lucas (1972) set in motion a new episode in economic thought which, after a
further fifty years, has left us with the macroeconomic theory which academic
economists now teach, and the practices which policy makers now implement.
Lucas is not to be held directly responsible for all of these consequences, and the
evidence suggests that at least one of them, namely the current marginalisation of
money itself in the theory and conduct of monetary policy, was not what he
intended. But, without his 1972 paper, macroeconomics would be very different in
2022.

Macroeconomics in Disarray
In 1972, still-dominant “Keynesian” ideas about theory and policy were under
extreme pressure on many fronts, though it was unclear whether, let alone how, the
several debates then in progress related to one another. Macroeconomics was “in
See Douglas Clement (2013) and Sargent (1996). Note, however, that Sargent recounts that it was
reading a draft of what became Lucas (1976) in 1973 that finally alerted him fully to the importance of
the 1972 paper.
1
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disarray,” to borrow a phrase that Karl Brunner (1989) would apply to a later
episode also to be discussed in these notes. Immediately prior to 1972, three major
themes were of particular importance:
First of all, Keynes (1936) had sought to explain the chronic unemployment of the
inter-war years, but, once World War 2 and its immediate aftermath were over,
high though fluctuating employment and inflation became the salient features of
market economies everywhere. In response, from the late ‘50s onwards, the
exponents of what was by then mainstream macroeconomics, following Bill
Phillips (1956) and Richard Lipsey (1960), incorporated the “Phillips relationship”
between inflation and unemployment, into their thinking, and then added a variable
measuring agents’ expectations of the inflation rate to the right hand side of the
equation describing it, though at first not always with the unit coefficient that the
theoretical work of Edmund Phelps (1967) and Milton Friedman (1968) implied.
This step, along with a then still hesitant revival of interest in the Fisher (1896)
effect of expected inflation on nominal interest rates gave new impetus to a search
for ways of giving substantive content to this variable. The error learning
hypothesis had provided a popular fix here since the 1950s, but no-one was
satisfied with it and a small scale industry had developed that was trying to
improve on it in all manner of often ad-hoc ways.2
Second, on the theoretical front, it had been noticed, again even in the 1950s, that
the two halves of the representative economic theory syllabus, usually labelled
“macroeconomics,” and “microeconomics,” bore little if any discernable analytic
relationship to one another. By 1972, a hunt for the so-called “micro-foundations
of macroeconomics” had long been in full cry, in a complicated literature whose
contributors shared a common belief that, wherever these might be found, it would
not be in the Walrasian general equilibrium theory in which markets always
cleared that figured so prominently in the microeconomic part of the syllabus.3
Third, and last but not least, by the early 1970s, the “Monetarist counterrevolution” against Keynesian ideas had become a major feature of
macroeconomic debates, particularly on the policy front. Monetarist doctrine had
See David Laidler and Michael Parkin (1975, pp.197-202), for an account of these efforts.
See, e.g., Don Patinkin (1956), Robert Clower (1965, 1967) Axel Leijonhufvud (1968), and Robert
Barro and Herschel Grossman (1976).
2
3

3

been developing haphazardly since the 1950s, under diverse leadership.4 But from
the outset it had centered around a clear central message: namely that, because the
demand for money function was, as a matter of empirical fact, both less interest
elastic and more stable over time than Keynes had claimed in 1936, “money
mattered” much more for the behaviour of the economy, and hence for economic
policy, than his followers were willing to allow. More specifically, inflation
everywhere was rising significantly by 1972 and presenting policy problems too
serious to be ignored, and Friedman’s (1970) still famous corollary to
monetarism’s basic theoretical propositions namely that “Inflation is always and
everywhere a monetary phenomenon,” was generating heated controversy both
within and beyond academia.

A New Orderliness
In short, in 1972, as in 1936, debates about macroeconomic issues were intense but
fragmented. In just nineteen remarkable pages - compare this to the General
Theory’s 403 - Lucas’s “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money” set out an
apparently comprehensive blueprint for the restoration of intellectual order to the
whole sub-discipline. Lucas offered his readers (or at least those who could follow
his difficult mathematics and explain its meaning to their colleagues): first, a
procedure for modelling expectations as the “rational” predictions of forwardlooking maximising agents who understood the properties of the economy in which
they operated, and applied this knowledge to their formation; second, an end to the
search for new micro-foundations for macroeconomics by showing that
fluctuations in output and employment were after all compatible with the
Walrasian general equilibrium model in which markets always cleared; and hence,
third, a theoretically rigorous reconciliation of a monetary explanation of inflation
with the simultaneous occurrence of those puzzling variations in real variables that
formed the empirical basis of Keynesian skepticism about it.
More specifically, Lucas showed that real fluctuations could occur if agents lacked
information about the current value of the general price level - an appealingly
realistic proposition - and thus had to base their decisions about real variables on
4

See, e.g., Friedman (1956, 1970), Brunner (1970, 1971).
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estimates of the structure of relative prices inferred from price information
obtained in local markets. In so doing, they would use their understanding of the
economy’s structure, as well as prior knowledge about the behaviour of the money
supply, and hence the price level, over time, not least about the time series
properties of disturbances to that behaviour. Real fluctuations would then be
generated when variations in the rate of monetary expansion came as a surprise,
and negative surprises in particular would cause real contractions even in the
presence of ongoing inflation. In the absence of surprises, however, money would
be neutral and prices would move in real-output-change-adjusted proportion to the
quantity of money. It is hardly surprising that, Lucas (1972) was widely and
immediately interpreted as providing, among other things, a ringing theoretical
endorsement of the basic empirical tenets of the Monetarist counter-revolution.

The new Classical Agenda
For those who, like for example Sargent and Wallace, understood and accepted this
powerful and unifying resolution of then-current macroeconomic debates, it also
provided a new analytic basis for the future development of the whole subdiscipline. Implications for, among other topics, the interpretation of then
ubiquitous macro-econometric models and the significance and appropriate
conduct of monetary policy were quickly made explicit and, by the late 1970s,
what was by then called “new Classical” economics seemed (to its adherents at
least) capable of dealing with all the traditional problems that the macroeconomics
that preceded it had faced.5 This property was particularly appealing to newcomers to the discipline who were seemingly relieved of the need to read anything
published before 1972, at least in macroeconomics. Any missing details of this
reconstructed sub-discipline could, furthermore, be filled in by the systematic
application to any issue of the analytic principles that new Classical economics
embodied, another feature well calculated to appeal to those same new-comers as
they looked for research topics.
The above-mentioned analytic principles required that the economy’s
“fundamentals” – endowments, tastes, technology and the rules of the game (i.e.,
5

See, inter alia, Lucas (1976), Sargent and Wallace (1975), and Lucas and Sargent (1978).
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forward looking maximising behaviour informed by rational expectations in
continuously clearing markets) – be explicitly described, that the nature of shocks
to it be precisely specified, and that all results be then rigorously derived from this
information, with no extraneous ad-hoc additions – e.g., “free parameters” whose
values were left to the data to determine – being allowed to intrude along the way.6
Any work that did not follow this blueprint was at least suspect, and to purists
among Lucas’s followers, not even worth discussion. As is usually the case with
such movements, Lucas, the founder of the new Classical school, was more
tolerant of dissent.
But refusals by many of its adherents to engage with those who disagreed with
them did not exempt new Classical economics from criticism, its unifying potential
for macroeconomics notwithstanding, and by the mid-‘80s Brunner (1989, but
delivered as a lecture 1986) would accurately characterise the sub-discipline as
having once more fallen into “disarray.” This state of affairs came about because,
although the new Classical economics of the 1970s failed abjectly in its encounters
with empirical experience, it simultaneously succeeding triumphantly in its efforts
to impose new professional standards of deductive rigour on the formulation of
theory.
The methodology of positive economics (in all of its many variations), so
influential before 1972, required (and still does) that, when an existing theory
encounters empirical problems, modifications to it should be conjectured and then
put to further test. After 1972, the insistence of new Classical economics on sound
micro-foundations limited admissible conjectures to those that could be
demonstrably deduced from “fundamentals.” If they did not meet this standard,
their compatibility (or lack thereof) with empirical evidence was deemed
irrelevant, and, lacking a satisfactory theoretical explanation, so was the relevance
of the evidence that had created the problem in the first place.7 The fact that these

I base this succinct characterization of new Classical methods on my personal recollection of a 1987 oral
presentation by Tom Sargent at a Siena conference aimed primarily at advanced graduate students. It does
not appear in the finally published form of the paper he presented (Albert Marcet and Sargent, 1992).
7
See, e.g., Robert Barro’s (1979) summary dismissal of contemporary models that incorporated a pricestickiness assumption.
6
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methodological views were of extremely questionable philosophical validity did
not prevent their widespread acceptance.8

Early Criticisms of new Classical Economics
A number of specific criticisms would quickly be levelled at new Classical
economics after 1972, with the earliest of these focussing on its most obviously
novel component, namely the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH). As Lucas
had formulated it, this treated information as either freely available to agents or not
at all. Thus its structure ruled out what Edgar Feige and Douglas Pearce (1976)
called “economically rational expectations,” the idea that the production and
processing of information might come with a rising marginal cost, and that the
behaviour of even rational maximizers might be therefore be based on less than all
available information about the situations facing them.
Not least, some argued that under such conditions agents might hold precautionary
money balances to cushion themselves against errors to which they would not be
exposed if the acquisition of market information were cheaper, and, for the price
setters among them, the costs of trading at “wrong” prices less punitive.9 That such
considerations might be empirically important was in due course decisively
confirmed by the finding of John Boschen and Grossman (1982). They showed that
readily observable current variations in US money growth were systematically
related to subsequent variations in real variables, rather than in only the price level,
as they would have been had agents been systematically monitoring them and
basing pricing decisions on this information. And they also showed that variations
in money growth that were not public knowledge, as represented by initial
measurement errors in the published data whose subsequent correction provided a
direct empirical measure of monetary “surprises,” had no discernable effect on
anything.
It took only a little longer for the empirical problems posed by Lucas’s treatment
of the expectations augmented Phillips curve to attract attention. It was, in fact,
already obvious from models that had deployed a market-clearing approach even
8
9

See, e.g., Kevin Hoover (1984) and Brunner (1989).
See, e.g., Laidler (1974, 1976).
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before 1972, including Lucas and Leonard Rapping (1970), that this assumption
implied that causation ran from prices (or money wages) to output (or
employment) along the curve, rather than in the opposite direction as had been
postulated by Phillips (1956). But, it does not seem to have been until the mid1970s that it was also noticed that this formulation was in conflict with one of the
best established stylised facts about the dynamic interactions of money with real
and nominal variables: namely, that, when money growth changes, changes in real
variables systematically precede those in the inflation rate. Attempts to deal with
this inconsistency would thereafter lead to some remarkable intellectual tangles
whose details are too complicated to explain here.10
This empirical problem was closely linked to another one whose significance had
been clear, not least to Lucas himself, from the outset: namely that of explaining
the persistence over time of deviations of output and employment from their
“natural” values after a monetary surprise. The rational expectations hypothesis as
formulated in (1972) eliminated the distributed lags implicit in the error learning
hypothesis that it had superseded and upon which earlier monetarist models had
relied to generate such persistence.11 But Lucas’s own (1973) empirical work
initially replaced these with equally arbitrary adjustment lags in the dynamics of
output deviations, and hence violated his own methodological ban on resort to
“free parameters” to reconcile theory with evidence. Nor did his second and much
more systematic effort (Lucas 1975) to address this problem by postulating a more
complex and drawn out mechanism describing the dissemination of information
fare any better in the face of the observation that the existence of economy wide
asset markets would short-circuit such effects.12
And there was a further, even more fundamental problem that went to the very
heart of Lucas’s desire, so obvious from his paper’s title, to vindicate a tradition in
the theory of money that dated back (at least) to David Hume (1752), while
simultaneously maintaining the market-clearing postulate: namely, that even in the

See, e.g., Barro’s (1978) efforts to fit a macro-econometric model embodying new Classical principles
with U.S. data.
11
See, e.g., Laidler (1973) and Laidler and Parkin (1975).
12
See Lucas (1975) and Edi Karni (1980). As Pierrick Clerc and Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira (2021)
show, recent efforts to revive interest in dispersed information as the source of economy-wide real
fluctuations have also encountered problems when addressing the issue of their persistence.
10
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1960s, it had been understood that the very nature of market clearing models was
incompatible with the institution of monetary exchange.13
An asset resembling “money,” could, of course, be formally introduced into such a
system. Lucas did so in (1972) using the overlapping-generations approach that
treated this asset as a pure store of value, and hence ignored money’s role in the
mechanism of exchange. This latter weakness is perhaps why, when he tried again
in (1984), Lucas instead borrowed Clower’s (1967) cash in advance constraint,
which made money a means of exchange and nothing else, from the very “microfoundations” literature that new Classical economics had allegedly rendered
redundant. However, this latter procedure violated the requirement that all
components of an economic model be deducible from fundamentals, and was in
any event, unable to match an already massive body of evidence about the
properties of real world demand for money functions. Buffer-stock models of the
demand for money, based on the notion mentioned earlier that information came at
a positive marginal cost, and its corollary that agents’ market decisions were based
on less than “all available” information seemed for a while to fare much better with
the data, but were routinely dismissed as irrelevant because they violated new
classical standards of deductive rigour, and they faded from the literature as the
1980s progressed.14

Monetary Policy at the Turn of the Decade
Meanwhile, during the 1970s, the political acceptability of anti-inflation policies
based on the control of money growth had been much enhanced, not only by the
growing seriousness of the actual inflationary situation in the wake of the failure of
Keynesian alternatives, but also by the rapid acceptance of new Classical ideas by
many of their academic advocates. The apparent predictions of the rational
expectations hypothesis about the likely low costs of monetary contraction
provided that it was preannounced, certainly played a role here, though how
significant this was is open to debate.

13
14

See, e.g., Frank Hahn (1965).
See Laidler (1988) for a brief and largely retrospective account of the debate about these models.
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Be that as it may, in the late 1970s, quasi-monetarist policies that focused on the
control of money growth were widely and conspicuously applied, with mixed
results. Where money growth fell so gradually as to be virtually invisible, nothing
much happened (e.g., Canada before 1981); where it was reduced systematically
and visibly, but with moderation, inflation stabilised and began to fall (e.g.,
Switzerland and West Germany); and where contraction was first delayed, and
then sharply and suddenly applied (e.g., the U.S., the U.K, and Canada after 1981)
inflation fell rapidly, but its fall was accompanied by real contractions on a scale
unprecedented in post-war experience. These were far more severe than monetarist
analysis, particularly when influenced by the rational expectations hypothesis, had
led anyone to believe.
The main lesson of this episode for the application of this hypothesis to policy
analysis was quickly absorbed: namely, that it is not sufficient simply to announce
a new monetary policy; rather if it is to proceed smoothly with little real disruption,
that announcement must also be credible. Observed relationships between changes
in money growth and the subsequent behaviour of output and prices during this
episode were nevertheless in qualitative accord with the predictions of traditional
monetarism. But a profession that had become widely accustomed to thinking of
new Classical economics as simply a more rigorous mark 2 version of this old
doctrine, carelessly misinterpreted the contractions of the early 1980s as
discrediting its mark 1 version as well.15
Thus, although this episode, may well have been, as Brunner (1983) would vainly
protest, traditional monetarism’s “failure that wasn’t and . . . success that was,” it
was, along with Friedman’s (1984) widely publicised and erroneous prediction of
the imminent reappearance of double digit inflation in its wake, interpreted as
undermining the empirical case for basing monetary policy on control of the
money supply. The theoretical case for this practice meanwhile continued its
already-begun journey into limbo as influential new Classical economists failed to
generate an empirically useful theory of money, but simultaneously remained

15

The Monetarism mark 1 and 2 labels are James Tobin’s (1981), and as far as I am aware, Lucas,
Sargent, Wallace et al. did not object to them.
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unwilling to countenance other approaches to the issue that violated their
methodological standards.16

Macroeconomics in Disarray Again
So, by the early ‘80s, the empirical and policy failure of Lucas’s macroeconomic
revolution, working in conjunction with its success in establishing a new
theoretical methodology for the sub-discipline, had also put a stop to Friedman’s
monetarist counter-revolution. Though some hoped for a Keynesian Recovery in
macroeconomic analysis on the lines pioneered by Leijonhufvud (1968) to ensue,
this approach remained a minority taste, leaving mainstream macroeconomics to
develop along two other principal lines.17
One was so-called “new-Keynesian” macroeconomics, which got its start with
Stanley Fischer (1977) and Phelps and John Taylor (1977). This approach, whose
relationship to Keynes (1936) was tenuous, re-established the phenomenon of price
stickiness as a respectable component of macro-economic models, first by way of
recognising the existence of labour market contracts, but later, and perhaps less
arbitrarily, by way of the replacement of perfectly with imperfectly competitive
markets as a fundamental structural assumption. The other was real business cycle
theory, pioneered by Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott (1982). This maintained
the new-Classical market clearing axiom, but attributed the occurrence of real
economic fluctuations to unspecified shocks not to the behaviour of money, or any
other demand side variable, but to a non-existent relationship, the aggregate

16

Search theoretic models, e.g., Robert Jones (1976) and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Randoph Wright (1989),
were too abstract to meet this test. See Laidler (1988) for a discussion. For an example of the new
Classicals’ refusal to acknowledge work on money that did not meet their theoretical standards, see
Wallace’s (1990) refusal to engage as a discussant with the empirical substance of James Lothian,
Michael Darby and Michael Tindall’s (1990) paper on buffer stock models of the demand for money.
The above italicised and optimistic phrase is borrowed from the title of Peter Howitt (1990), an
undeservedly neglected collection of essays written between 1974 and 1988, that significantly extend the
approach to the micro-foundations of macroeconomics pioneered by Clower and Leijonhufvud.
17
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production function, and explained their persistence by the fact that capital
equipment takes “time to build.”18
What these otherwise incompatible approaches had in common was an
unshakeable belief in the irrelevance of money, neutral or not, for any interesting
empirical question that might have some relevance to economic policy. For new
Keynesians such as Michael Woodford (2003) this stance derived its authority first
of all from the beliefs of old Keynesians such as Tobin (1981) and Benjamin
Friedman (2003), who had never been convinced by the monetarist attacks of the
‘60s and ‘70s, but was considerably re-enforced by their adoption of new Classical
modelling techniques in formal analysis that left no room for money to play an
essential role in the stories they developed. For real business cycle modellers, it
followed inevitably from their self-conscious insistence, directly inherited from
Lucas, on clearing markets as the basis for all acceptable analysis.
Real business cycle theory could, of course, find room if need be, and soon did, for
the arbitrary introduction of “outside” money to determine the price level, in a nod
to formal completeness, and also for “inside money” to respond passively to real
fluctuations, much as it did in new (or even post) Keynesian systems.19 But nothing
of further interest followed from this fact. Lucas, who would subsequently make
the neutrality of money the central topic of his 1995 Nobel Prize Lecture and
would be the author of at least four empirical papers in which the demand for
money function figures prominently, could hardly have been happy with this
outcome.20

The Emergence of Inflation Targeting
If macroeconomics was indeed in disarray by the mid-1980s, monetary policy still
had to be conducted. Central banks searched for ways of keeping inflation is single
Difficulties with the concept of an aggregate production function have been known to exist since the
third (1821) edition of David Ricardo’s Principles, and figure prominently in modern heterodox work that
follows the lead of Piero Sraffa (1960). But, for terse statement of them in the neoclassical tradition, see
Franklin Fisher (2005).
19
See Robert King and Charles Plosser (1983).
20
See Lucas (1988), Lucas (2000), Lucas and Nicolini (2015), Luca Benati, Lucas, Juan Pablo Nicolini
and Warren Weber (2017).
18
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digits and perhaps reducing it further. In a few cases, notably West Germany and
Switzerland, where the local quasi-monetarist regimes adopted in the 1970s had
not collapsed, these continued to evolve until the creation of the Euro decisively
changed the landscape. But elsewhere, not least in jurisdictions where quasimonetarist regimes had, fairly or not, been judged outright failures, ad hoc drift
became the order of the day, until, in the early ‘90s, policy makers, led by those in
New Zealand, Canada and the UK, stumbled on inflation targeting. This approach
was adopted by its pioneers for many and various local reasons, as much political
as economic, none of which had much to do with then current (or even obsolete)
academic ideas about the nature of the monetary economy.21 The resulting regimes
were widely emulated elsewhere as the decade progressed.
Even so, the seamless interweaving of a credible policy goal that anchored
inflation expectations with a formal macroeconomic model which came to
characterise those regimes by the turn of the millennium did not already exist as an
available framework for the theory and practice of policy in the early 1990s; it was
the product of subsequent learning by doing.22 Even the credibility that began to
characterise inflation targets in some jurisdictions during that decade had not been
confidently predicted on the basis of the rational expectations hypothesis when
they were first introduced. It too was the product of experience as central banks, to
their own surprise one suspects, actually succeeded in hitting their targets with
noticeable frequency during the “the Great Moderation” that followed their
adoption.23
But, the fact that inflation was low and fluctuations in it were small under inflation
targeting, had another effect: namely, it left essentially nothing for variations in
money growth to explain.24 To adopt vocabulary taken over by the ECB from the
Bundesbank, by the end of the ‘90s, it seemed to most observers that monetary
policy was adequately supported by its “economic pillar” alone, rendering its
“monetary pillar” redundant and hence disposable. So, central banks everywhere
On New Zealand and the UK, see Charles Goodhart (2010), and on Canada see Charles Freedman
(2010) and Laidler (2020).
22
The model, which forms the basic template for Woodford (2003), consisted of an expectationsaugmented Phillips curve, a function relating output to the deviation of the real interest rate from its
“normal” level, and a Taylor rule to determine the policy setting of the nominal rate.
23
For a detailed account of these developments in the Canadian case, see Laidler (2020).
24
See Laidler (2003), especially figs. 1a, 1b, and 1c.
21
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did indeed dispose of it. Thus, though inflation targeting is sometimes referred to
as “monetarism without money,” because, partially echoing Friedman (1970), it
treats the medium term behaviour of the price level as the only goal of monetary
policy, and delegates shorter-term stabilisation issues (if needed) to other policy
tools, its adoption owed nothing to the rational expectations hypothesis, and its
conduct came to ignore money entirely, neutral or otherwise. It is hard to claim,
therefore, that it owed anything to Lucas (1972).

The Crisis of 2007-9
The financial crisis of 2007-9 put a violent end to the great moderation. It proved
to be a notable example of that “residue of things” (Lucas 2004) which the bythen-dominant stochastic dynamic general equilibrium analysis that had its origins
in Lucas (1972), hadn’t been letting its exponents think about for more than a
quarter century. Except among heterodox Austrians and post-Keynesians, and a
very few others, such as Claudio Borio and William White (2004), who
remembered that US experience in the late ‘20s had shown that the maintenance of
price stability is not sufficient to ward off financial and real instability, reaction to
this crisis was therefore characterised by extreme shock, followed by much
intellectual muddle.
Fortunately, however, the Fed’s rapid appreciation of the contemporary relevance
of US experience during the Great Contraction of the early 1930s prevented a
repeat of this earlier catastrophe. That institution led the world’s policy makers in
doing whatever was necessary to save the international economy, financial and
real, from complete collapse. But the immediate inspiration here came not from
any revival of monetarist ideas about the role played by money in the earlier
episode. Rather it came from Chairman Ben Bernanke’s (1983) work on the
importance of credit market failures in that story.
Any chance of a serious revival of interest in monetarist ideas as events unfolded
was, furthermore, nipped in the bud by warnings of imminent inflation, as strident
and widely publicised as they were unwarranted, emanating from some of their

14

most distinguished surviving exponents.25 These commentators had apparently
failed to notice that the policy induced explosion in the size of the Fed’s balance
sheet after 2008 was not leading to a corresponding expansion of the quantity of
money, a phenomenon associated with the payment of interest on newly created
reserves during this episode, but which had also marked the experience of the mid1930s. They thus set monetarism up for what was once more perceived to be major
empirical failure, every bit as dramatic, though every bit as fictitious, as that of the
early 1980s.

Complicating Inflation Targeting
If the crisis of 2007-9 thus pushed money even further to the margins of serious
macroeconomic discourse, it also undermined the simplicity of inflation targeting
as it had been practiced until then. Financial markets had ceased to function in
some jurisdictions, and for a while, the trajectories of prices and output had
threatened to mimic those of 1930. And even where the impact of the crisis was
less dramatic, simply to cut short interest rates as low as was institutionally
feasible, and then await the recovery of the inflation rate, had been immediately
and universally recognised as an absurdly inadequate policy response.
Thus, by simple force of economic and political circumstances, output and
employment began to rejoin the inflation rate as policy targets during what came to
be called “the great recession” and fiscal policy re-emerged as an important
companion to monetary measures. In the monetary field specifically, all manner of
policy instruments were also rushed into place to supplement the overnight interest
rate, and two of these are of particular interest here: quantitative easing (QE), and
forward guidance (FG). Not only did they play significant roles immediately after
2008 but, resurrected in the wake of the economic crisis brought on by the Covid
pandemic that began in 2020, they now dominate the monetary policy landscape.
QE is a new name for an old measure, Open Market Operations, which were
strongly recommended to an unfortunately reluctant Fed in the early 1930s by,
among many others, Keynes (1931), and also, albeit in retrospect, by Friedman and
Anna Schwartz (1963). The latter emphasised the beneficial influence that open
25

See, e.g., Allan Meltzer (2009).
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market operations might have had on money growth in the early ‘30s, but presentday exponents of QE ignore this channel, stressing instead its capacity to lower
long term interest rates. Not coincidentally, this was Keynes’s (1931) view of the
matter which, transmitted by Bernanke’s work on the Depression, was readily
absorbed by new Keynesian economics. Today’s QE is hardly a legacy of
Monetarism, then, and, to return to the topic of these notes, it owes nothing to
Lucas (1972) either.
The intellectual antecedents of FG are more difficult to identify. The aim of
today’s central banks, when they are precise and explicit in communicating their
future policy intentions, is to influence the public’s expectations and hence amplify
their responses to current measures. It would be foolhardy to deny the possibility
that such measures reflect a lasting influence of Sargent and Wallace’s original
deployment of Lucas’s rational expectations hypothesis in the analysis of monetary
policy, supplemented by later evidence on the vital importance of clarity and
credibility in the communication of policy intentions. And it is also hard to deny
that the now famous phrase “Whatever it takes” worked exactly as intended.
But the passage from The General Theory quoted above (para. 1) is hardly unique
in Keynes’s writings in stressing the importance of expectations in economic life:
the Treatise on Money (1930, ii, 352-367), an example particularly relevant in the
current context, contains a lengthy discussion of the importance of the behaviour of
the short rate of interest, including expectations engendered by it, for that of long
rates and hence for investment spending. And discussions of “announcement
effects” were commonplace in the monetary policy debates of the 1960s, not least
among central bankers. The following quotation is drawn from the Bank of
England’s contribution to a 1969 conference: “The role of expectations is . . .
much greater than is normally assumed in academic and journalistic comment.
Changes in the climate of expectations brought about by events . . .or by the timing
and manner of the announcement and implementation of policy measures – can
often act to negate or greatly reinforce the tactics of the authorities” (Bank of
England (1970), p. 228).
Perhaps, then, we need to suspend judgement on how much importance should be
attached to the introduction by Lucas (1972) of the Rational Expectations
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Hypothesis into macroeconomics for the development of today’s ideas about FG,
pending a little more systematic historical research on the matter.

The Current Macro-policy Situation
So, ironically, the characteristic of today’s monetary policy scene on which the
influence of Lucas (1972) is most definitely apparent seems to be the almost total
absence of attention currently being paid to the behaviour of money in discussions,
let alone in the actual conduct, of policy.26 As already noted, this is probably not an
outcome that Lucas intended, but it was logically implicit in the analytic principles
he propounded, and it is extremely important at the current policy juncture for
several reasons.
First, by adopting in late 2020 “no-change until late 2022 or mid 2023” FG for
their then rock bottom policy interest rates, inflation targeting central banks in
effect declared that monetary policy henceforth had two explicit and well
publicised targets. The inflation rate remained policy’s ultimate goal but was
joined by a target for its basic instrument, the overnight rate. Second, and
crucially, though QE may not have been intended to promote money growth when
it was introduced on a large scale in 2020, it did, with a vengeance. The money
supply veritably exploded in some jurisdictions for a while in 2020 and (at the time
of writing) is still expanding at rates that are high by the standards of the last three
decades. And finally, it now looks possible that, as a result, monetary policy’s two
targets are proving to be incompatible. If this is really so, central banks will be
forced to raise interest rates ahead of schedule in the face of persistently abovetarget inflation rates, and their credibility with the public, not to mention their
political masters, will be badly damaged, perhaps to the extent of making an
orderly restoration of any regime based on an independently pursued medium term
goal for inflation in the next few years extremely problematic.
On the other hand, the current (again at the time of writing) mainstream consensus
that money does not matter may turn out to be correct after all. The current
The italicised qualification is significant: dissenting commentators are few, but Michael Belongia and
Peter Ireland, Tim Congdon, Steve Hanke, Robert Hetzel, and Scott Sumner continue to stress the
importance of the quantity of money in numerous publications.
26
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inflation might still prove to be transitory and fade away of its own accord as
central banks are predicting. If these things happen, then all will be well with the
theory and practice of monetary policy that has dominated the last three decades.27
But if they don’t, if the most basic monetarist proposition about the behaviour of
the price level, that was adopted unquestioningly in Lucas (1972), (despite its
incompatibility with his analytic approach): namely, that it is determined by the
interaction of the supply and demand for money, and its corollary that in the long
run inflation responds systematically to variations in money growth, are still true,
then there is serious economic and political trouble ahead. Macroeconomics thus
seems to be in the middle of an important natural experiment.

The Significance of Lucas (1972) Today
To sum up, then: it seems that the influence of “Expectations and the Neutrality of
Money” began to wane forty years ago, and that its only remaining visible effect
has been one that its author did not intend, namely to undermine the theoretical
element in the case for according money a central role macroeconomic analysis.
But if there were no more to matters than this, we would not now be celebrating
the fiftieth anniversary of its publication. To understand why it seems natural to do
so, we need to adopt the viewpoint not of current practitioners of macroeconomics
seeking help from Lucas in dealing with current problems of theory and policy, but
of historians of the field, seeking to understand what role his work has played both
in creating them and forming the ideas we bring to them.
As I hope is apparent from the preceding pages, it is my personal view that the
publication of that paper half a century ago marked a decisive turning point in the
trajectory of thinking about the macro-economy and hence, as a consequence, in its
actual behaviour as well. Had Lucas (1972) not been written and read, the
intellectual landscape, not to mention the external economic environment, we
currently inhabit would be very different. Whether this has been for the better or
the worse would require speculation on what the alternatives might have looked
like, and that is a task best left to other authors who were less involved than this
one in the debates of the last fifty years.
27

Though let it be clear that this is not my own expectation.
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